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Notes
"VICARIOUS IMMUNITY" OF PRIVATE PERSONS
IN SECTION 1983 ACTIONS:
"AN UNEXAMINED ASSUMPTION"'
In most federal circuits, when all the "state" defendants in an action under 42
U.S. C. § 1983 are accorded immunity, so are any private defendants who have
allegedly acted in concert with them. After tracing the evolution ofthis doctrine of
"vicarious immunity" and weighing the arguments for and against it, the author
proposes the rejection of the doctrine and the adoption in its stead of a subjective
and objective good faith standard for private section 1983 defendants alleged to
have acted in concert with state officials.
IN RECENT YEARS the number of suits brought under 42
U.S.C. § 19832 has burgeoned. Although the vast majority of
1. The phrase was used by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961): "a statutory interpretation which started as an unexamined assumption on
the basis of inapplicable citations and has the claim of a dogma solely through reiteration."
Id at 220-21.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
3. In fiscal year 1960, 280 federal cases were filed under all the civil rights acts.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1960 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
DIRECTOR 232, table C2. This figure accounted for 0.5% of the civil workload. Id at 230,
table C2. In fiscal 1977, 19,079 "private" (i.e., where the United States was not a party)
civil rights cases were filed in federal court, comprising 14.6% of the civil docket. ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIREC-
TOR 317-318, table C2. Because the United States cannot sue or be sued under § 1983,
United States v. Biloxi Mun. School Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Miss. 1963), a/t'don other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964), only private civil rights cases were counted. The total
number was computed by adding 7,750 civil rights prisoner petitions to 11,329 private suits
under the general heading of civil rights. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 318, table C2. The exact number of
these private civil rights actions that were brought under § 1983 cannot be determined
because the civil filing forms used by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
do not ask courts to distinguish between the different civil rights statutes.
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these suits are against state officials,4 section 1983 actions against
private persons are not uncommon.- Courts have deemed private
parties to be acting "under color" of state law and thus amenable
to section 1983 in two situations: when they exercise a function
traditionally performed by the state6 or when they engage in joint
activity with the state.7 In either situation, private persons are
utilizing the power of the state, and consequently, section 1983
requires them to exercise that power within its constitutional
bounds. Since 1965, however, several courts have severely lim-
ited the liability of the private individual who acts in concert with
a public official by holding that when the official is himself im-
mune from section 1983,8 the private individual is too since he has
not conspired with a person against whom a valid claim can be
asserted.' Thus, this private defendant benefits vicariously from
the immunity accorded the public official.
4. For the purposes of this Note, "state officials," "public officials," and "public ser-
vants" are used interchangeably. Each refers to an employee or official of a state or subdi-
vision of a state. The Supreme Court has determined that the District of Columbia is not a
"State or Territory" within the meaning of § 1983. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409
U.S. 418 (1973).
5. McCormack & Kirkpatrick, Immunities of State Officials Under Section 1983, 8
RuT.-CAM. L.J. 65, 81 (1976).
6. Eg., Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970) (landlord enforcing a lien, his-
torically a function of the sheriff); Larkin v. Bruce, 352 F. Supp. 1076 (E.D. Wis. 1972)
(private person bringing a public nuisance action under a state statute that permits him to
proceed in place of the state attorney general), appeal dismissed, 483 F.2d 1407 (7th Cir.
1973); Decarlo v. Joseph Home & Co., 251 F. Supp. 935 (W.D. Pa. 1966) (private detective
making an arrest).
7. Eg., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (conspiracy between a store
employee and a policeman to deny service to a white teacher in the company of black
students); Due v. Tallahassee Theatres, Inc., 333 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1964) (an exhibitor and
a county sheriff acting in concert to enforce racial segregation in a theater); Kissinger v.
New York City Transit Auth., 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (a company, under con-
tract with the New York City Transit Authority to sell advertising, refusing to accept anti-
war posters).
8. A wide range of state officials have a qualified immunity from § 1983. Only three
have an absolute immunity: legislators, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); judges,
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); and prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976). See text accompanying notes 51-87 infra.
9. The doctrine of "vicarious immunity" is established in five circuits: Kurz v. Michi-
gan, 548 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1977); Hansen v. Ahlgrimm, 520 F.2d 768 (7th Cir. 1975); Waits
v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3rd Cir. 1975); Guedry v. Ford, 431 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1970);
Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965); and three district courts outside these
circuits: Dennis v. Hein, 413 F. Supp. 1137 (D.S.C. 1976); Harley v. Oliver, 404 F. Supp.
450 ( .D. Ark. 1975), affd on other grounds, 539 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1976); Stambler v.
Dillon, 302 F. Supp. 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Only the First Circuit has refused to apply the
doctrine and has held instead that private persons who conspire with an immune state
official may be liable under § 1983. Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito Y Ahorro
Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976); accord, Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31 (1st Cir.
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While the section 1983 immunities of certain state officials
may well be justified, it is the contention of this Note that these
immunities should not be vicariously enjoyed by private persons.
Part I of the Note gives a brief overview of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of section 1983. Part II examines in more detail the
Court's construction of section 1983 immunities for certain public
officials. The following part demonstrates how the doctrine of
vicarious immunity has extended these immunities to private per-
sons. The Note concludes by taking issue with this doctrine and
by proposing instead a section 1983 defense of subjective and ob-
jective good faith for private persons who act in concert with state
officials.
I. THE BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF SECTION 1983
Section 1983 was enacted as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871.10 The Act, which became known as the Ku Klux Klan
Act, was passed in response to rampant, organized atrocities per-
petrated by the Klan against blacks and white Republicans."
While other sections of the Act were designed to reach the lawless
activities of the Klan,' 2 section 1983 was aimed primarily at the
inaction of state and local authorities in the face of this lawless-
ness. 13  Thus, it provided a federal remedy for deprivations of
1977) (dictum), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978). See text accompanying notes 98-156
infra.
In Sparkman v. McFarlin, No. 75-129 (N.D. Ind. May 13, 1976), rev'd, 552 F.2d 172
(7th Cir. 1977), rev'dsub nom. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), the district court
followed the principle of vicarious immunity that had been established in the Seventh Cir-
cuit. On appeal, however, only the issue ofjudicial immunity reached the Supreme Court.
While the Court did not consider the issue of vicarious immunity, it did note the split in the
lower courts. 435 U.S. at 364 n.13.
10. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970)).
For a more comprehensive discussion of the background of § 1983, see Developments in
the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1135-1190 [hereinafter
cited as Section 1983 Developments].
I1. See CONG. GLOBE, 42 Cong., Ist Sess. 152-58 (1871); D. CHALMERS, HOODED
AMERICANISM 8-21 (1965).
12. Sections 2-5; see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app., at 335-36 (1871).
13. "[Tjhe remedy created was not a remedy against [the Klan] or its members but
against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce
a state law." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961) (emphasis original).
For an example of alleged inaction by state officials in response to the Klan's atrocities,
see CONG. GLOBE 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app., at 505 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Pratt):
[O]f the hundreds of outrages committed upon loyal people through the agency of
this Ku Klux organization not one has been punished. This defect in the admin-
istration of the laws does not extend to other cases. Vigorously enough are the
laws enforced against Union people. They only fail in efficiency when a man of
known Union sentiments, white or black, invokes their aid. Then Justice closes
the door of her temples.
1016 [Vol. 28:1014
19781 "VICARIOUS IMMUNITY" 1017
constitutional guarantees by state officials."
To prevail under section 1983, a plaintiff had to demonstrate:
(1) that he had been deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the Constitution or federal law, and (2) that this depri-
vation had occurred under color of state law.'4 While the broad
language of the statute promised an accessible and effective vehi-
cle for redressing constitutional deprivations, its vagueness left the
scope of the statute susceptible to judicial manipulation.1 5
In the Slaughter-House Cases, 6 a post-Reconstruction
Supreme Court was called upon to decide which privileges and
immunities were secured by the Constitution through the four-
teenth amendment. In keeping with its policy of limiting the role
of the federal government, 17 the Court held that the privileges and
immunities mentioned in article IV, section 218 were state created
rights.19 In a much criticized opinion,2" Justice Miller reasoned
that article IV did not create these rights, but merely ensured that
whatever fundamental rights a state granted its own citizens
would not be denied to citizens of other states.2 Since these fun-
damental privileges and immunities originated in the states, they
were left to the state governments for protection and were not sub-
ject to the supervision of the federal government.22 Thus, the ef-
14. See note 2 supra.
15. "The dominant conditions of the Reconstruction Period were not conducive to the
enactment of carefully considered and coherent legislation. Strong post-war feeling
caused inadequate deliberation and led to loose and careless phrasing of laws relating to
the new political issues." United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 74 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.).
16. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
17. E.g., C. COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 22-23 (1912).
18. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
19. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78.
20. Eg., Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3,
24-25 (1954); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Our CivilRights Legislation, 50 MicH. L.
REV. 1323, 1337-38 (1952). Contra, P. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH 268 n.37
(1975).
21. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77.
22. Id at 78. Justice Miller built on dictum in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546,
551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). In Corfield, Judge Washington construed the
"privileges and immunities" of article IV, section 2 to be "fundamental; which belong, of
right, to the citizens of all free governments," id at 551, and suggested that these rights
might fall under the following headings: "[p]rotection by the government; the enjoyment of
life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue
and obtain happiness and safety . I. " Ad at 551-52. While the opinion has been much
cited, it is unclear whether its interpretation of the provision guaranteed substantive rights
secured by the Constitution or merely ensured that visitors to a state would be treated the
same as local citizens. Justice Miller gave it the latter construction, while Justice Field
emphasized that the privileges and immunities are those that "belong to the citizens of all
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fect of the Slaughter-House decision was to eliminate practically
all civil rights from the protection of the fourteenth amendment.
Alongside this narrow interpretation of the fourteenth amend-
ment emerged the state action or "under color of state law" re-
quirement.23  As the Court explained in the Civil Rights Cases .
24
It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. In-
dividual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter
of'the amendment .... Positive rights and privileges are un-
doubtedly secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are
secured by way of prohibition against State laws and State pro-
ceedings affecting those rights and privileges .... 25
Thus, the fourteenth amendment did not reach the actions of pri-
vate individuals but only those of state governments or state offi-
cials.
In dictum, the Civil Rights Cases laid the foundation for the
next assault on the fourteenth amendment by stating that if illegal
conduct was not "sanctioned in some way by the State," it did not
amount to state action. 26Relying on this dictum, the Court, in Bar-
ney v. City of New York," dismissed a suit to enjoin the construc-
tion of a subway tunnel where the plaintiff alleged that such
construction would constitute a taking of his property without due
process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 2  The
Court stated that unauthorized activity by public officials in viola-
tion of state law was not "action by the State," and consequently,
no basis for federal jurisdiction existed.29  Although Barney was
substantially cut back by subsequent decisions,3 ° it was generally
free governments." 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 97 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis original). Fair-
man, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5,
9-12 (1949).
23. Insofar as the 1871 Civil Rights Act was passed to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment, "under color" of law is read as coincident with "state action." United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966) (and cases cited therein); Brief for United States at 45,
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (where the issue was first argued). Con-
ira, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 216 -18 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
24. 109 U.S. 5-(1883).
25. Id at 11; see Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879), where the Court, in
dictum, stated: "the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .all have reference to
State-action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals."
26. 109 U.S. at 17.
27. 193 U.S. 430 (1904).
28. Id at 430-33.
29. Id at 437.
30. Eg., Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913); Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909); Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S.
20 (1907).
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accepted that action prohibited by the state was not state action.3'
Thus, the illegal conduct of state officials that section 1983 was
designed to reach was now beyond its scope.
The Supreme Court's narrow construction of both privileges
and immunities, and state action severely limited the use of sec-
tion 1983. In fact, until the Court's seminal decision in Monroe v.
Pape in 1961,32 the statute lay virtually dormant.33  The founda-
tion for Monroe was laid in two cases that involved violations of
criminal provisions of the 1870 Civil Rights Act.34 In United
States v. Classic,35 the Court held that the conduct of state election
officials, although illegal, had occurred under color of state law:
"Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made pos-
sible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law."
36
This interpretation was affirmed four years later in Screws v.
United States.37 Writing for a plurality of four, Justice Douglas
held that the fatal beating of a young black had been administered
under color of law:
Here the state officers were authorized to make an arrest and to
take such steps as were necessary to make the arrest effective.
They acted without authority only in the sense that they used
excessive force in making the arrest effective. It is clear that
under "color" of law means under "pretense" of law.38
Thus, at least in a criminal context, state officials could be held
liable for illegal or unauthorized conduct if it occurred under
"pretense" of law.
The stage was set for Monroe.3 9 In circumstances only too
31. Eg., Section 1983 Developments, supra note 9, at 1161 n.139; see, e.g., Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 212-17 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
32. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
33. Eg., Section 1983 Developments, supra note 9, at 1161; see Comment, The Civil
Rights Act: Emergence ofan Adequate Federal Remedy, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951) (stat-
ing without citation that from 1871 to 1920 only 21 cases were brought under § 1983.
SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS (6th ed. 1968) indicates only 15 Supreme Court
cases involving § 1983 during the 51-year period). Until Monroe, the most successful use
of § 1983 was in the area of voting rights. See Comment, supra at 370.
34. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 6, 7, 16 Stat. 140 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241, 242 (1970)).
35. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
36. Id at 326.
37. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
38. Id at 111.
39. 365 U.S. 167.
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similar to the atrocities that inspired section 1983,40 police, with-
out a warrant, allegedly broke into and ransacked the home of a
black family. The Court found that the plaintiff's fourth amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable searches had been vio-
lated.4' The defendants contended, however, that they had not
acted under color of law since their conduct had not been author-
ized by state law or custom. 42 The Court, again per Justice Doug-
las, held that the interpretation given "under color of law" in the
criminal setting was applicable to civil cases as well.43  Thus, it
was settled: the "ultra vires" defense of public officials was no
longer available in section 1983 suits.
Of course, Monroe alone did not cause the deluge of section
1983 actions that were filed in the next seventeen years.44 In ad-
dition to occurring under color of law, the deprivation must in-
volve a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution.
Although Justice Miller's majority opinion in the Slaughter-House
Cases has made the privilege and immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment a "dead letter,"' 45 the Court subsequently has
given expansive readings to both the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses. As a result, the number of constitutionally pro-
tected rights has mushroomed. This coupled with Monroe's
interpretation of "under color" has been the impetus for the vast
increase in section 1983 filings.
II. SECTION 1983 IMMUNITIES
The recent flood of section 1983 litigation has placed an in-
creasing burden on the federal courts.46 Part of this burden has
been dissipated by Supreme Court decisions which have granted
either absolute47 or qualified48 immunity to state officials acting in
40. Id at 203 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in.part); see Shapo, Constitutional Tori:
Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277, 277-78 (1965).
41. 365 U.S. at 171.
42. Id at 172.
43. Id at 187.
44. See note 3 supra.
45. See text accompanying notes 16-22 supra.
46. See note 3 supra.
47. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967) (udges); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators).
48. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison officials); O'Connor v. Don-
aldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (superintendents of mental hospitals); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (gover-
nors, university presidents, officers and members of national guards); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967) (policemen).
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their official capacity.49 This portion of the Note examines the
standards the Court has applied in establishing these immunities
in order to provide a framework for determining if and to what
extent private persons who act in concert with state officials
should be immune from section 1983 liability.
The sweeping remedial language of section 198350 neither
mentions nor suggests immunity. Yet, rather than apply the stat-
ute literally and thereby expose every state official to a standard
of strict liability, the Court has generally relied upon common law
principles of immunity. Beginning with Tenney v. Brandhove,51
the Court held that state legislators acting within their official ca-
pacity are immune from suit under section 1983.52 The Court
reasoned that the doctrine of legislative immunity was so well es-
tablished by both federal 3 and state5 4 constitutional provisions
49. While normally only an absolute immunity will defeat a suit prior to trial, both
types of immunity effectively decrease the number of § 1983 filings by deterring potential
plaintiffs from suing. An official who enjoys an absolute immunity will prevail at the
outset, as long as he can establish by pleadings or affidavit that his actions were within the
scope of his immunity. On the other hand, a qualified immunity requires the defendant to
prove that he acted in good faith and usually does not avoid a trial. But Sf Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (defendant prison officials, accused of interfering with a
prisoner's mail, prevailed on a motion for summary judgment by establishing that they
acted in good faith as a matter of law, since at the time of their actions no constitutional
right concerning the correspondence of convicted prisoners had been clearly established).
In addition to restricting the use of § 1983 by creating immunities for various state
officials, the Court has also narrowed the scope of the statute by its recent § 1983 decisions
which have expressed a concern for states' rights. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977) (no cruel or unusual punishment in light of adequate local supervision of the
administration of corporal punishment in public schools); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976) (finding no federally protected interest in reputation to sustain cause of action in a
defamation suit against local police officials); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (finding
no persuasive pattern of law enforcement intimidation that would justify abrogating broad
principles of federalism applicable to internal disciplinary affairs of state agencies).
50. "Every person who, under color of any statute. . . subjects. . any ... other
person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities ... shall be liable. .. .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (emphasis added).
51. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
52. Id at 379.
53. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6 provides in part that:
Senators and Representatives.. . shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and
Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the
Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other Place.
Some have contended that judicial immunity is, by implication, constitutionally pro-
tected. Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 588-89 (3d Cir. 1966) (abrogation of judicial im-
munity would deprive states of republican form of government guaranteed by article IV,
§ 4 of the Constitution); Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 362 (1879) (dissenting opinion)
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and by common law55 that if Congress had intended to eliminate
the doctrine, it would have done so expressly. In support of this
argument, the Court noted that legislators are naturally staunch
advocates of legislative freedom, and if they were to curtail legis-
lative immunity, they would be unlikely to do so in a covert man-
ner.56  Moreover, the Court approved of the policy rationale
underlying the immunity: namely, that legislators should be free
to act without fear of reprisal in performing their official duties. 7
Similarly, in Pierson v. Ray,"8 the Court held that judges act-
ing within their jurisdiction are immune from section 1983.19 The
Court relied on essentially the same reasoning as it had in Tenney.
It found absolute immunity for judges to be solidly grounded at
common law6° and clearly warranted by the need to protect the
(independence of state in federal union requires independence of state judicial as well as
legislative officials), noted in Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79
YALE L.J. 322, 324 n.13 (1969). Legislators, however, enjoy the only immunity that is
explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
54, When Tenney was decided, 41 of the 48 states had analogous constitutional provi-
sions establishing legislative immunity. 341 U.S. at 375.
55. Id at 373-74, 377 (discussing Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808) and Fletcher
v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810)).
56. 341 U.S. at 376.
57. Id at 373.
58. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
59. Id at 554-55.
60. Id at 553-54 (discussing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872)). The
plaintiff in Bradley alleged that he was maliciously disbarred by the defendant judge. The
court held that judges are not liable "for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in
excess of their jurisdiction" (for example, convicting someone of a nonexistent crime). In
dictum, Bradley stated that when judges act in the complete absence of subject matter
jurisdiction, they are not immune from civil suit. Id at 351-52.
Citing Bradley, the Pierson Court observed that "few doctrines were more solidly estab-
lished at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts
committed within their judicial jurisdiction .. " 386 U.S. at 553-54. Contra, 386 U.S.
547, 563-64 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (discussing Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339
(1879)); Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 325-27 &
nn.29-32 (1969). It is interesting to note that Bradley was decided after the 1871 Civil
Rights Act was passed. A proper legislative inquiry would have considered Randall v.
Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868). Randall differed from Bradley in that it suggested
that judges may be liable for corrupt or malicious judicial acts. Id. at 536.
The recent Supreme Court case of Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), shed new
light on the scope of judicial immunity. The plaintiffs in Stump sued a judge for approv-
ing a sterilization petition. Justice Stewart, in dissent, opined not that the defendant judge
acted without jurisdiction but that his approval of the petition did not constitute a judicial
act. Id at 365 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In both Bradley and Pierson, there was no ques-
tion that the defendant judges' conduct was judicial in nature. As a result, neither opinion
defined what constitutes a judicial act. In Stump, the Court stated that the "factors deter-
mining whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, ie.,
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objectivity and integrity of judicial decisionmaking. 6' The Court
reasoned that Congress would have provided specifically for the
abolition of judicial imniunity had it so intended.62
A second aspect of Pierson involved three police officers ac-
cused of false arrest and imprisonment and the defense available
to them under section 1983. The Court did not expressly consider
the legislative intent towards policemen. It did, however, ex-
amine the common law defense to false arrest and the policy be-
hind it.63 Relying on the dictum in Monroe v. Pape64 that section
1983 "should be read against the background of tort liabil-
ity. .... ,61, the Court accorded the police officers the defense of
good faith and probable cause-the same defense available to
them in a common law tort action for false arrest and imprison-
ment.66
whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the
parties, i e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." Id. at 362.
61. "[I]t is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the
benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their
functions with independence and without fear of consequences." 386 U.S. at 554 (quoting
Scott v. Stansfield, [1868] L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223), quotedin 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 349-50 n.:.
Moreover, Pierson reasoned that a judge's "errors may be corrected on appeal, but he
should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging
malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to princi-
pled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation." 386 U.S. at 554.
62. 386 U.S. at 554 -55. Chief Justice Warren treated the issue of legislative intent
summarily, simply stating that "[t]he legislative record gives no clear indication that Con-
gress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities." Id at 554.
Justice Douglas disagreed. Quoting from the Reconstruction debates, he contended
that the statute was aimed at lawlessness due in part to judges who were in many instances
"wholly inimical to the impartial administration of law and equity." Id at 559 (Douglas,
J., dissenting in part) (quoting CONo. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 374 (1871) (remarks of
Rep. Rainey)). Moreover, Justice Douglas pointed out that every legislator who spoke to
the question of judicial immunity assumed that judges would be liable under the statute.
386 U.S. at 561 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). These legislators, however, were all oppo-
nents of the 1871 Civil Rights Act and might naturally have tended to exaggerate what they
considered to be the ill effects of the legislation.
63. 386 U.S. at 555.
64. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
65. 386 U.S. at 556 (quoting Monroe v..'Pape, 365 U.S. at 187).
66. The Pierson Court's use of the Monroe dictum has caused courts much confusion.
In Monroe, the Court analogized to tort law to demonstrate that a less stringent standard of
intent was required by § 1983 than the willfulness that was necessary under a criminal
statute. Pierson extended the tort aialogy to § 1983 defenses. By citing to the Restate-
ment of Torts and a treatise on torts, Pierson suggested a strict application of the relevant
tort defense. Many courts have accepted this rigid interpretation, see, e.g., Anthony v.
White, 376 F. Supp. 567 (D. Del. 1974) (discussed in Bristow, § 1983 An Anaisis and
Suggested.Approach, 29 ARK. L. Rnv. 255, 277 (1975)) (deciding a § 1983 suit by applying
§ 662 of the Restatement of Torts), without recognizing that the divergent policies of§ 1983
and tort law may sometimes require different results. Nahmod, Section 1983 and the
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A review of Tenney and Pierson reveals that the Court has
developed a two-step approach to establishing section 1983 immu-
nities. Tenney demonstrated that the threshold issue in a section
1983 immunity analysis is one of statutory construction-namely,
did Congress intend that there be no immunities under section
1983? By holding that state legislators are immune from section
1983 suits, the Tenney Court clearly indicated its conviction to
answer this question in the negative. The second step of the anal-
ysis involves weighing the importance of the common law immu-
nity to determine whether a similar immunity should be accorded
under section 1983. Here, the Court examines the policy behind
the immunity and decides whether such an immunity is necessary
to protect the office of the relevant official. In Tenney and Pier-
son, resolving this issue in the affirmative meant applying the
common law immunity intact to section 1983.
Scheuer v. Rhodes6 7 added a third tier to the Court's construc-
tion of section 1983 immunities. In Scheuer, the Court was con-
cerned with the defenses of executive officials. Scheuer began
with the same two-step analysis used in Tenney and Pierson. As
in Tenney, it first reasoned that section 1983 had not been in-
tended to be read in derogation of common law principles of im-
munity.68 Next, the Court considered the importance of an
immunity for executive officials and concluded that some immu-
nity-absolute or qualified-was warranted, reasoning that it was
better to permit some injuries to remain unredressed than to in-
hibit forthright executive decisionmaking. 69 At this point in its
"Background"of Tori Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 10-11 (1974): "Because constitutional inter-
ests are at stake, deterrence, as furthered by the private enforcement of fourteenth amend-
ment guarantees, might be more important under section 1983 than it is under tort law."
Id. (footnote omitted). See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (Harlan, J., concurring):
"It would indeed be the purest coincidence if the state remedies for violations of common-
law rights by private citizens were fully appropriate to redress those injuries which only a
state official can cause and against which the Constitution provides protection."
Moreover, courts are in conflict as to whether Pierson requires an application of the
pertinent state common law defense or whether it mandates a federal constitutional stan-
dard. Compare Thamel v. East Hartford, 373 F. Supp. 455 (D. Conn. 1973) (defense of
good faith and probable cause not available to police officers in a § 1983 suit for false
arrest for a misdemeanor, since under Connecticut law a misdemeanor must occur in the
officer's presence in order for him to act on it without a warrant) with Street v. Surdyka,
492 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1974), and Diamond v. Morland, 395 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Ga. 1975)
(both courts according police officers the federal constitutional defense of probable cause
in cases involving § 1983 actions for false arrest for a misdemeanor).
67. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
68. Id at 243-44.
69. Id at 241-42.
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analysis, the Court added a new wrinkle. Instead of adopting the
common law immunity intact,7 ° it balanced the need to protect
executive conduct with the objectives of section 1983 and held that
executive officers would not be liable under section 1983 where
they had acted upon "reasonable grounds . . . , coupled with
good-faith belief .... ,71 Thus, by considering the purposes of
section 1983, Scheuer rejected the absolute immunity granted ex-
ecutive officials at common law and instead accorded them only a
qualified immunity.
The first section 1983 immunity case confronted by the Court
after Scheuer was Wood v. Strickland.72 In Wood, the Court ap-
plied a similar three-tier analysis in determining the immunity to
be accorded school board officials. First, recalling the prior
cases, the Court observed that in enacting section 1983 Congress
did not preclude the application of common law principles of im-
munity." Second, after surveying the common law, the Court
concluded that under it, school officials enjoyed immunity with
respect to "all good-faith, nonmalicious action taken to fullfill
their official duties,"74 and that absent this qualified immunity,
individuals would be deterred from serving on school boards and
those that did would be fearful of making independent and force-
ful decisions.7" On the other hand, an absolute immunity would
be unjustified, since its benefits would be outweighed by "the ab-
sence of a remedy for students subjected to intentional or other-
wise inexcusable deprivations."76
In the third step of its analysis, the Court balanced the need to
protect school board members from being intimidated from prop-
erly performing their duties with the need to maintain the viability
of section 1983.77 Accordingly, the Court concluded that a school
board member should be immune from section 1983 liability only
if he has acted both in subjective good faith (ie., with an honest
belief) and in objective good faith (i e., with due care).78
The next full Supreme Court opinion recognizing an immunity
70. Both Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564
(1959), had established an absolute immunity for executive officials.
71. 416 U.S. at 247.
72. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
73. Id at 316-17.
74. Id. at 318 n.9.
75. Id at 319-20.
76. Id at 320.
77. Id. at 319-20.
78. Id. at 322.
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under section 1983 was Imbler v. Pachtman.7 9 In establishing an
absolute immunity for prosecutors, Imbler added a possible fourth
step to the Court's three-tier approach to section 1983. Imbler
began its analysis by noting that the language of the statute sug-
gests strict liability.80 By reviewing the section 1983 immunity
precedents, however, the Court demonstrated that this interpreta-
tion has not prevailed.8 ' Moreover, the Court cited Tenney as
establishing that "§ 1983 is to be read in harmony with general
principles of tort immunities . . . rather than in derogation of
them. "82
Next, Imbler examined the common law and found that, in
general, prosecutors have historically enjoyed absolute immunity
from civil suits.8 3 The Court then considered the import of such
an immunity and decided that it was necessary to protect the pros-
ecutor's role.84 Like Scheuer and Wood before it, 1mbler did not
simply adopt the common law immunity. Rather, it queried
whether the same policies that supported an absolute immunity at
common law were similarly applicable under section 1983. The
Court concluded that if prosecutors were accorded anything less
than absolute immunity from section 1983 actions, their
prosecutorial functions would be unacceptably inhibited.85 Fur-
thermore, the Court noted that prosecutors could be controlled by
criminal sanctions and professional discipline.86
The Court narrowed the situation to which its holding would
apply by adding a fourth step to its section 1983 analysis. Using a
functional analysis, Imbler held that when a prosecutor was acting
in a quasi-judicial capacity, either by initiating a prosecution or
presenting a case, he had an absolute immunity from section 1983
79. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 463 (1975), the Court
remanded the issue of a state mental hospital superintendent's liability under § 1983 so that
it could be considered in light of Wood.
80. 424 U.S. at 417.
81. Id at 417-19.
82. Id at 418.
83. Id at 421-22.
84. Id at 422-23.
85. Id at 427-28. The Court explained that "[tihe public trust of the prosecutor's
office would suffer if he were constrained in making every decision by the consequences in
terms of his own potential liability in a suit for damages." Id at 424-25. Moreover, as
with a judge, claims against a prosecutor will drain his time and divert his energies from
the primary responsibilities of his office. Id at 425. See generally Note, Delimiting the
Scope of Prosecutorial Immunity From Section 1983 Damage Suits, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 173,
180-83 (1977).
86. 424 U.S. at 429.
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liability.87 The functional analysis that Imbler employed is rele-
vant only when determining the immunity of an official who
wears more than one hat. However, the three-tier approach used
by the Scheuer and Wood Courts can be applied to any section
1983 defendant-even the private defendant.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF "VICARIOUS IMMUNITY"
Although section 1983 is generally considered a remedy for
abuse by public officials, it has been broadened to include private
defendants. As previously noted, when private individuals exer-
cise a function traditionally performed by the state, they are
clothed with the authority of the state and therefore act under
color of state law.88  In the 1970 decision Adickes v. S.. Kress &
Co.,8 9 the Supreme Court held that private persons who willfully
participate in joint activity with state officials act under color of
law for purposes of section 1983.90 The expansion of the under
color requirement in Adickes was based on United States v.
Price,91 a case which, like those cases relied upon in Monroe, in-
volved the criminal counterpart of section 1983.92 In Price, three
police officers allegedly conspired with fifteen private individuals
to murder three civil rights workers by releasing them from jail,
thwarting their "escape," and eventually killing them.93 As to the
private defendants, the Court held:
87. Id at 430-31. Under a functional analysis, a prosecutor enjoys an absolute im-
munity similar to that of a judge when the prosecutor functions in a quasi-judicial role.
When the prosecutor operates in an investigatory capacity, carrying out police-like activi-
ties, he has only a qualified immunity similar to a police officer's. Note, supra note 85, at
187-90; see, e.g., Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536-37 (9th Cir. 1965).
Imbler did not comment on whether it would have granted only a qualified immunity had
the defendant been acting in an investigatory manner. 424 U.S. at 430-31.
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), is the most recent Supreme Court case to
establish an immunity under § 1983. Procunier is an anomaly since it abandoned the
mode of analysis developed in prior § 1983 immunity cases. Id. at 568 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). Instead of fashioning an immunity by balancing the interests of the role of the
defendant prison officials with the policies of § 1983, the Court summarily applied the
qualified immunity that it had previously articulated in Wood even though Wood had
expressly limited its holding to the context of school discipline. 420 U.S. at 322.
88. See note 6 supra.
89. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
90. Id at 152.
91. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
93. 383 U.S. at 790.
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Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the pro-
hibited action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of
the statute. To act "under color" of law does not require that
the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a
willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents.94
In Adickes, the defendant store refused to serve lunch to a
white school teacher who was in the company of six black stu-
dents.95 The teacher alleged that the defendant had deprived her
of her right not to be discriminated against on the basis of race
and that the refusal to serve her resulted from a conspiracy be-
tween the defendant and a policeman.96 The Court found that
the under color requirement was satisfied, holding that a private
party involved in a conspiracy with a state official could be liable
under section 1983.97 This holding promised to establish a far-
reaching precedent by exposing a new class of persons to section
1983 liability. Five years prior to Adickes, however, in Haldane v.
Chagnon,98 the Ninth Circuit had extended the immunity of a
state court judge to two private attorneys who had allegedly con-
spired with the judge.99 In so doing, Haldane introduced the
principle of vicarious immunity. The development of this doc-
trine would, to a significant extent, frustrate the use of Adickes as
a means of imposing section 1983 liability on private defendants.
The suit in Haldane arose from a divorce proceeding during
which the presiding judge had ordered that one of the parties,
Eldon Haldane, undergo a psychiatric examination.lOAs a result
of having been subjected to the examination, Haldane brought a
section 1983 damage claim for over ten million dollars against the
trial court judge, the judge who had signed the order for the
mental examination, and two attorneys and a bailiff who had been
either directly or indirectly involved in filing the petition for the
examination. 10 1 Arguing pro se, Haldane stated in a rambling
94. Id at 794.
95. 398 U.S. at 149.
96. Id at 147-48.
97. Id at 152. The Court also held that the plaintiff could establish a § 1983 claim
against the private defendant if she could prove that she was denied service because of a
custom of racial segregation in public restaurants that had "the force of law by virtue of the
persistent practices of state officials." Id at 167. This was the first time the Court had
examined the "custom or usage" language of § 1983. See note 2 supra.
98. 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965).
99. Id at 604-05. Haldane had Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959), as
precedent for finding that private persons who conspire with state officials act under color
of state law. Id at 298.
100. 345 F.2d at 602.
101. Id
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complaint that the defendants had conspired to violate a number
of his constitutional rights.'0 2 The case was dismissed by the dis-
trict court, and Haldane appealed, attempting to join ten more de-
fendants and to increase his damage claim to twenty-three million
dollars. 1o3
The Ninth Circuit found the defendant judges and the bailiff
immune from section 1983 liability.I° As to the defendant attor-
neys, the court held:
The attorneys were not State officers, and they did not act in
conspiracy with a State officer against whom appellant could
state a valid claim. It follows that they did not and could not,
commit the alleged wrongful acts "under color of state law or
authority;" hence they are not subject to liability under the
Civil Rights Act.10
5
The holding in Haldane implies that had the state officers not
been immune, the private defendants would have committed the
alleged illegal acts under color of law.'06 Yet, by stating that the
attorneys were not under color of law because they did not con-
spire with a public official against whom a valid claim could be
stated, the court extended the immunity of the state officials to the
private defendants.0 7 There was no precedent for such a ration-
ale. The cases cited by the court merely stood for the proposition
that private attorneys do not act under color of state law.10 8
Thus, the doctrine of vicarious immunity began as a mere as-
102. Id Haldane's complaint was not available, but the following sample from his
brief is typical of his legal writing style:
THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER was thought to have been abolished in
1641. Not so; it exists today, headquartered at IlI N. Hill St., Los Angeles...
presided over by Pierson Hall, I., who conducts the judicial business of the
United States in the dark, ex parte, without notice or hearing .... The Constitu-
tion HAS BEEN DESTROYED in all the HALDANE cases. DUE PROCESS
OF LAW now lies GROUND TO DEATH in state and federal courts within the
Ninth Circuit, the authority and jurisdiction of the SUPREME COURT, nullified
by the local Hidlers, Himmlers, and Stalins ON THE BENCH, AT THE BAR.
Brief for Appellant at 5-6, Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965) (citations
omitted).
103. Brief for Appellees (Byrne and Fortas) at 2, Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601
(9th Cir. 1965).
104. 345 F.2d at 604.
105. Id at 604-05.
106. Id
107. Id
108. Skolnick v. Spolar, 317 F.2d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 1963); Skolnick v. Martin, 317 F.2d
855, 857 (7th Cir. 1963); Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705, 706 (10th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 944 (1949); Swift v. Fourth Natl Bank, 205 F. Supp. 563, 566 (M.D. Ga.
1962).
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sumption based on inapplicable citations. 109
The first court to apply Haldane was the Southern District of
California in Shakespeare v. Wilson. 0  The plaintiff's suit was
based on nine unsuccessful civil suits and one criminal prosecu-
tion in which she had been acquitted."' She brought an action
under sections 1981-1986 against sixty defendants, including
twenty-one judges and several private defendants." 2 Arguing
pro se, she alleged vague acts of misconduct and attempted to give
them a constitutional color by inserting references to due process
and equal protection.' Judicial immunity defeated the claims
against the state officials."' A section 1985(3) claim against the
private defendants, alleging a conspiracy between them and vari-
ous judges, was dismissed on the basis of Haldane."5
In 1969 the vicarious immunity principle gained momentum
when it was applied for the first time outside of the Ninth Cir-
cuit." 6  In Stambler v. Dillon,' ' 7 the plaintiffs, unsuccessful in
three civil actions, brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, seeking five hundred thou-
sand dollars in damages from the judge who had ruled against
109. See note 1 supra.
110. 40 F.R.D. 500 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
111. Id at 502-03. The court explained:
This action filed in pro per. is a typical example of the kind of action being filed
with increasing frequency under the provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1871,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1986. Having been defeated in state court proceedings and
being unhappy and somewhat humiliated and frustrated by the results of such
proceedings, these persons lash out at judges, attorneys, witnesses, court function-
aries, newspapers and anyone else in convenient range, terming all of them cor-
ruptly evil and charging them with perjury and conspiracy in a last desperate
effort to re-litigate the issues on which they have once lost and hoping to secure
sizeable damages to boot.
Id at 502.
112. Id at 503.
113. Id For a similarly pleaded § 1983 suit, which also was dismissed with reference to
Haldane, see Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1974): "Sykes' complaint is typical
of an increasing number of actions brought under the Civil Rights Statutes, whereby a
plaintiff seeks to vindicate solely state law claims by peppering his allegations with fre-
quent, vague references to due process and equal protection." Id at 202.
114. 40 F.R.D. at 503, 504-05.
115. Id at 504.
116. In dictum, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
had stated that a private person "could not conspire with [a judge] who is immune under
the Civil Rights Act." Jemzura v. Belden, 281 F. Supp. 200, 206 (N.D.N.Y. 1968). Pre-
sumably, the court meant that a private individual does not act under color of law when he
conspires with an immune judge. For support, the court cited Haldane and Bottone v.
Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948), apparently assuming the latter was precedent for
Haldane. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
117. Stambler v. Dillon, 302 F. Supp. 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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them, the opposing parties, their counsel, a trial witness, and vari-
ous other private individuals. 18 The plaintiffs, appearing pro se,
alleged in conclusory language that the defendants had conspired
to deny them due process and equal protection." 9 The court
ruled that the judge's actions were within the scope of his judicial
capacity and that under Pierson2 ° he was immune from liabil-
ity 1 21 As to the private individuals, the court cited Haldane and
Shakespeare and held that these defendants could not be "liable
under § 1983 because they did not act in conspiracy with a state
official against whom a valid claim could be stated. Conse-
quently, their allegedly wrongful actions were not done under
color of state law. .... "122
Certain similarities emerge from this trilogy. All were
prompted by adverse verdicts in state court; in effect, the plaintiffs
were attempting to use the civil rights statutes to appeal the state
court judgments.123 All the cases were argued pro se-often in
broad, rambling, and conclusory language stating what appeared,
at least on their face, to be frivolous claims. In each instance the
plaintiffs were suing everyone "in convenient range"'124 and de-
manding seemingly excessive damages. In sum, it appears that
the plaintiffs in these suits, whether knowingly or unknowingly,
were abusing the judicial process. As a consequence, when various
section 1983 immunities defeated the claims against all the de-
fendants save the alleged private co-conspirators, the Shakespeare
and Stambler courts were perhaps less apt to scrutinize a prece-
dent that by its application would dismiss the claims against the
remaining defendants and in so doing, achieve seemingly just re-
sults.
By the middle of 1975, the Fifth, 25 Third,' 26 and Seventh 27
Circuits had fallen in line and adopted the doctrine of vicarious
immunity. Yet not one court that had applied the doctrine had
ever mentioned any underlying policy justifications. The Seventh
118. Id at 1252.
119. Id
120. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
121. 302 F. Supp. at 1254-55.
122. Id at 1255.
123. Eg., Shakespeare v. Wilson, 40 F.R.D. 500, 504 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
124. Id at 502.
125. Guedry v. Ford, 431 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1970).
126. Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975).
127. Hansen v. Ahlgrimm, 520 F.2d 768 (7th Cir. 1975).
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Circuit, in Grow v. Fisher,128 was the first court to discuss the rule
and to question its rationale.
Claude Grow claimed that the defendants, a prosecutor and
five private individuals, had acted in concert to deprive him of
various constitutional rights.' 29 The court found that the prose-
cutor, in deciding whether or knot to prosecute, had acted in a
quasi-judicial capacity and thus was absolutely immune from sec-
tion 1983 liability. 130 The Grow court then briefly discussed the
principle of vicarious immunity. After first questioning the doc-
trine, the court suggested a possible rationale for the rule: if pri-
vate persons were brought under the umbrella of immunity, they
would be less fearful of the consequences of "getting involved"
and reporting crime to the authorities.13 1 In the end, although the
Seventh Circuit had previously adopted the principle of vicarious
immunity, it expressly refused to decide Grow on this basis. 32
Instead, it dismissed the claims against the private defendants on
other grounds, and the doctrine remained intact. 133
One year later, in Dennis v. Hein,134 the South Carolina Dis-
trict Court applied the doctrine of vicarious immunity and en-
dorsed the policy rationale that Grow had suggested. '35 In Dennis,
the lessor of a truck swore out a criminal warrant against the
lessee in order to collect an unpaid bill, charging breach of trust
with fraudulent intent. The warrant was signed by the county
magistrate, and the lessee was subsequently arrested, jailed, and
128. 523 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1975).
129. Id at 876-77. The complaint stated that "Amy J. Blanche signed a criminal
affidavit charging plaintiff Claude Grow with having unlawfully assaulted and battered
with intent to gratify sexual desires said Amy Blanche's daughter, defendant Linda K.
Blanche (McElfresh), then sixteen (16) years of age." Id at 876. The affidavit was ap-
proved by a state prosecutor who proceeded to bring Grow to trial. Although Amy
Blanche, Linda Blanche, Paula Eaton (Webb), and Lee Blanche all testified against Grow,
he was found not guilty. Id Grow alleged that after the trial, Lee Blanche attacked him
with a blackjack, and that Grow swore out an affidavit against him. Although the prose-
cutor's office approved Grow's complaint against Blanche and had him arrested, Blanche
was never brought to trial. Grow further alleged that Lee Blanche had subsequently
beaten him, that Fred Eaton had threatened to kill him, and that Amy Blanche had
harassed him by telephone. Id
130. Id at 877.
131. Id at 878.
132. Id
133. The dismissal of the claim was based on the court's determination that, entirely
apart from the issue of immunity, the plaintiff had developed only general, conclusory
allegations insufficient to establish that his constitutional rights had been violated by con-
certed action on the part of the private defendants and the state official. Id at 879.
134. 413 F. Supp. 1137 (D.S.C. 1976).
135. Id at 1141.
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released only after posting bond in an amount approximately
equal'to the unpaid bill.' 36 The lessee brought a section 1983 ac-
tion against the lessor, alleging that he had conspired with the
magistrate to deny the plaintiff his constitutional right not to be
arrested or imprisoned illegally.1 37 The court dismissed the case,
finding that the magistrate enjoyed judicial immunity and that the
immunity extended to the lessor.' 38 The Dennis court reasoned
that to permit courts "to entertain actions based on such allega-
tions . . . of conspiracy between private citizens and judicial of-
ficers would subject every complainant in every case to potential
liability," thereby deterring private citizen involvement in the
treatment of crime. 139
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Kermit Construe-
tion Corp. v. Banco Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 4 was the first
court to refuse to extend official immunity under section 1983 to
private co-conspirators. The plaintiff sued a bank, a construction
company, and a court-appointed receiver for conspiring to avoid
payment of a debt owed the plaintiff. The First Circuit decided
that the receiver was an officer of the court and, as such, was enti-
tled to judicial immunity. But it held also that the private de-
fendants could not benefit from the receiver's immunity. 14'
Kermit did not explain its decision not to extend official immunity
to the private co-conspirators, nor did it acknowledge the contrary
authority in other jurisdictions.
Slotnick v. Staviskey 42 afforded the First Circuit an opportu-
nity to discuss its holding in Kermit. In Slotnick, the plaintiff al-
leged that various public officials and private parties had
conspired to deprive him of a number of his civil rights. 43 The
district court heard the case prior to Kermit and felt compelled to
follow the precedent established in the other circuits. 1" Thus, it
applied the doctrine of vicarious immunity and dismissed the
136. Id at 1138.
137. Id at 1139. The plaintiff also alleged malicious prosecution and abuse of process.
The latter was based on the allegation that the lessor was using the office of the magistrate
to collect his unpaid bills. Id at 1138.
138. Id at 1141.
139. Id
140. 547 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976).
141. Id at 2, 3.
142. 560 F.2d 31 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978). In the period
between Kermit and Sloinick, the Sixth Circuit had adopted the doctrine of vicarious
immunity. Kurz v. Michigan, 548 F.2d 172 (6th Cir. 1977).
143. 560 F.2d at 32.
144. Id
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claims against the private defendants. 41 In so doing, the court
explained that to allow civil suits against parties allegedly conspir-
ing with judges would force judges to serve as witnesses and ex-
plain their actions almost as if they themselves were on trial. To
permit this, the court reasoned, would make judges vulnerable to
indirect harassment and thus contravene one of the policies of ab-
solute judicial immunity. 146
On appeal, although the First Circuit affirmed, it did not apply
the doctrine of vicarious immunity. 47  Instead, it dismissed the
claims against the private defendants on the ground that the alle-
gations of conspiracy were conclusory and not based on material
fact. 48  In dictum, speaking only for himself, Chief Judge Coffin
criticized the extension of immunity to private co-conspirators and
approved the First Circuit's decision in Kermit-
To hold otherwise would give an ill-conceived defense to judge
and conspirator alike .... [W]hile others accord substantial
weight to the embarrassment and inconvenience which a judge
might suffer if he could be summoned into court as a witness,
this writer looks upon such an interest as less important than
that of bringing conspirators to book.1
49
Since Slotnick, the Southern District Court of New York'
and the Fifth Circuit'' have continued to apply the doctrine of
vicarious immunity.'52 Neither court has acknowledged Kermit
145. Id
146. Slotnick v. Stavisky [sic], No. 73-3954, proceedings at 38-40 (D. Mass., filed Sept.
23, 1976).
147. 560 F.2d at 33-34. In a footnote, Chief Judge Coffin suggested that the doctrine
of vicarious immunity has been undercut by Price and Adickes since "[tihese cases estab-
lish that private individuals who conspire with state officers are acting 'under color' of state
law, whether or not the state official is actually joined in the suit." Id. at 33 n.l. The
vicarious immunity of private persons, however, does not depend on whether the official is
joined but on whether he is immune. For example, the Dennis court, after determining.
that the magistrate had acted within the scope of his jurisdiction, extended his immunity to
his alleged private co-conspirator even though the magistrate was not a party to the suit.
413 F. Supp. at 1141. Moreover, since the issue of official immunity was not raised in
either Price or Adickes, neither case considered the principle of vicarious immunity. As a
result, these decisions did not affect the precedential value of the vicarious immunity line
of cases.
148. 560 F.2d at 33-34.
149. Id at 33 n.1.
150. Russell v. Town of Mamaroneck, 440 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
151. Perez v. Borchers, 567 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1978); Humble v. Foreman, 563 F.2d 780
(5th Cir. 1977).
152. In Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit inexplica-
bly referred to the vicarious immunity language in Haldane as dictum and stated that "[i]t
is unclear whether a private party who is clothed with immunity is liable under
§ 1983." Id at 858 n.10.
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or Judge Coffin's dictum in Slo'tnick. Finally, in Stump v. Spark-
man,153 the Supreme Court noted the split between the First and
Fifth Circuits.'54 Because the private defendants in Stump had
previously been dropped from the suit, the principle of vicarious
immunity was moot, and the Court confined its treatment of the
issue to a citation of the conflicting authority1 55 Stump is the
most recent case to note the issue of vicarious immunity, and thus,
at present, the doctrine prevails in five circuits courts and three
district courts outside these circuits.1 56
IV. A PROPOSED REPLACEMENT FOR THE DOCTRINE OF
VICARIOUS IMMUNITY: THE DEFENSE OF SUBJECTIVE
AND OBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH
As demonstrated in Part II, the Supreme Court has developed
a three-tier approach to establishing section 1983 immunities.
Such an analysis considers (1) the legislative intent of the statute,
(2) the principles of immunity established under the common law,
and (3) the interests which the particular defendant represents in
light of the purposes of section 1983. In creating the doctrine of
vicarious immunity, the Ninth Circuit in Haldane"'57 did not take
into account any of these considerations. Indeed, the only sup-
port given by the court for its holding was the illogical assertion
that the private defendants could not have acted under color of
state law because their alleged co-conspirators were immune from
section 1983.158 This portion of the Note attempts a more rea-
soned analysis of the doctrine of vicarious immunity. It con-
cludes by taking issue with the doctrine and by proposing in its
stead a more suitable defense for private persons who have acted
in concert with public officials.
As previously noted, Tenney' 59 and its progeny stand for the
proposition that by enacting section 1983 Congress did not intend
to impose a standard of strict liability for constitutional viola-
tions.160 Rather, these cases indicate that at least certain individ-
153. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
154. Id at 364 n.13.
155. Id
156. See note 9 supra.
157. 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965).
158. Id. at 604-05.
159. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
160. See text accompanying notes 51-82 supra.
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uals are entitled to some kind of immunity under the statute. 61
The issue of whether private defendants should be immune from
section 1983 never arose, however, since the statute was not aimed
at private persons. 6
2
Moreover, when section 1983 was enacted, there was no com-
mon law precedent for vicarious immunity. 16 3  What precedent
there is today is based on the faulty logic of Haldane. In
Haldane, the Court reasoned that a private person does not act
under color of state law if the public official with whom he con-
spires is immune from suit under section 1983.164 However,
whether or not a public official is accorded immunity in no way
alters the manner in which his alleged private co-conspirator has
acted, and thus it seems absurd to argue that under these circum-
stances a private defendant has not acted under color of state
law. 165
At this point there appears to be no justification for the doc-
trine of vicarious immunity in either the legislative history of the
statute or in the common law. The third step of the Court's anal-
ysis balances the purposes of the proposed defense with the objec-
tives of section 1983. If vicarious immunity is to be justified, it
must be on this basis.
Imposing liability under section 1983 can conceivably serve
three objectives: (1) the deterrence of conduct proscribed by the
statute, (2) the compensation of plaintiffs injured by such conduct,
and (3) the retributive punishment of morally culpable section
1983 defendants.1 66  The doctrine of vicarious immunity contra-
161. See text accompanying notes 51-87 supra.
162. See note 13 supra.
163. See text accompanying notes 99-100 supra.
164. 345 F.2d at 604-05.
165. The Haldane court's confusion may have stemmed from the belief that an im-
mune public official does not act under color of state law and that consequently his private
co-conspirator does not act under color of law. The immunity of a state official, however,
does not mean that the official does not act under color of law, but that for the protection
of the functions and responsibilities of his office, he avoids liability. See also W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS 970 (4th ed. 1971).
166. While deterrence and compensation are generally considered to be the two policy
objectives of § 1983, see Bristow, § 1983."An Analysis and Approach, 29 ARK. L. REv. 255,
274 (1975), a third objective may be the retribution of morally (as opposed to legally) cul-
pable defendants. See, e.g., Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 1975); Palmer
v. Hall, 517 F.2d 705, 707 (5th Cir. 1975), cited in Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Fro-
posals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedyfor Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87
YALE L.J. 447, 464 n.66 (1978) (In both cases, punitive damages were awarded for aggra-
vated § 1983 violations. Of course, rather than acting punitively, these courts may have
been merely emphasizing the deterrence objective of the statute).
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venes each of these objectives. By allowing a private person to
escape liability because of the status and conduct of his alleged co-
conspirator, the doctrine undermines the deterrence objective
while denying compensation to plaintiffs who might otherwise
have been granted relief. The third possible objective, retribu-
tion, may also be frustrated if a private person has violated an
individual's constitutional rights in bad faith and has avoided lia-
bility merely because of his alleged co-conspirator's immunity.
Nevertheless, if the countervailing policy considerations that sup-
port the doctrine of vicarious immunity outweigh the purposes of
section 1983, the doctrine may well be justified.
There are two possible reasons for extending official immunity
to private defendants: (1) to make it unnecessary for an official to
participate in the trial of his alleged private co-conspirator,
thereby protecting the official from harassment and the public
from increased governmental costs; 167 and (2) to prevent private
persons from being deterred from cooperating with state officials
because of fear of prosecution under section 1983.168 In regard to
the first rationale, forcing an official to participate in a trial will
consume government time and may result in the official's integrity
being called into question, but this is a lesser harm than denying
an individual a remedy for a constitutional deprivation and the
public the deterrent effect of that remedy. Thus, the incremental
benefit that an immune official and the government derive from
vicarious immunity cannot justify upholding the doctrine.
Nor can the doctrine of vicarious immunity be justified on the
basis of its impact on private individuals. As currently construed,
a private person's liability depends entirely on the conduct and
status of the official with whom he has allegedly conspired.
When a private party acts in concert with a judge, he is absolutely
immune so long as the judge acts within his jurisdiction; when the
judge acts outside his jurisdiction, the private person enjoys no
immunity. When an individual is involved in joint activity with a
police officer, he is immune as long as the policeman exercises
good faith and acts with probable cause.169 When the police of-
ficer's conduct does not meet this constitutional standard, his pri-
vate co-conspirator is accorded no immunity. Thus, because a
167. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
168. See text accompanying note 139 upra.
169. Except, of course, in those instances when this defense is unavailable to a police
officer. See note 66 supra.
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private person's liability is determined by the conduct and status
of his co-conspirator, vicarious immunity will often cause unjust
results. The individual who maliciously swears out a complaint
will not be liable under section 1983 so long as his co-conspirator
acts within his official immunity, while the person who in good
faith enlists the help of a policeman may be found liable if the
officer is subsequently found to have violated the Constitution in
bad faith. The possibility of such unjustified liability may well
deter private persons from cooperating with public officials.
Therefore, it is specious to argue that the doctrine of vicarious
immunity should be upheld because of its impact on private indi-
viduals.
If the objectives of section 1983 are to be reconciled with the
need to encourage cooperation with public officials, a private per-
son's liability must depend on his conduct and not that of his al-
leged co-conspirator. Before determining what defense a private
party should be accorded under section 1983, it is necessary to
decide whether an individual should be granted any defense at all.
Under a standard of strict liability, the law would not discriminate
between good faith errors and acts of malice. The consequences
of such a policy would often be harsh and inequitable, and would
presumably deter private persons from cooperating with state offi-
cials. To avoid this result, some immunity-absolute or quali-
fied-should be established for private section 1983 defendants.
Although absolute immunity would encourage individuals to
aid public officials, it would so severely undercut the purposes of
section 1983 that the resultant harm would outweigh the benefit
derived. An alternative would be to grant private persons a de-
fense of subjective and objective good faith. This defense re-
quires not only that a defendant believe in good faith that his
actions are lawful but also that his belief be reasonable.7 0 While
such a standard would deter unconstitutional conduct, it would
not unreasonably inhibit individuals from cooperating with public
officials.
Unlike the defenses available under the doctrine of vicarious
immunity, the subjective and objective good faith standard would
attach to a private co-conspirator in all situations. Thus, a private
defendant's liability would be determined by his actions and not
by the conduct and status of his co-conspirator. While individu-
170. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972)
(defining good faith defense available to federal agents).
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als would be deterred from using the offices of the state to harass
private persons, they would not be discouraged from aiding public
officials. In this way, the defense of subjective and objective good
faith better resolves the section 1983 policy tensions than the de-
fenses available under the present doctrine of vicarious immunity.
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